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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS
KEITH J. SHAPIRO*
I. INTRODUCTION
With each passing year since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code"),' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit has become increasingly involved in
substantive issues of bankruptcy law. The cases discussed in this article
are some of the most interesting and controversial decisions of the Sev-
enth Circuit for the period from June 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984.
II. WHEN IS A GARNISHMENT A PREFERENCE?
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code sets out five conditions
which must be met before the trustee will be authorized to avoid a trans-
fer as a preference. 2 One of these conditions concerns the timing of the
transfer. If a transfer is deemed to have occurred on or within the 90-day
period described in Section 547(b)(4)(A), and the other requirements of
Section 547(b) are met, the transfer may be avoided by the trustee as a
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I. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer
of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such
transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provi-
sions of this title.
203
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preference.3 Determining if and when such a transfer has occurred has
proven difficult where wages are garnished within 90 days of the filing of
a bankruptcy petition pursuant to a garnishment order issued prior to the
90-day period.4
The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in In re Coppie,5 where the
wages of two separate debtors were garnished pursuant to an order of an
Indiana court. As the Seventh Circuit ponted out, much of the contro-
versy surrounding the time of transfer results from variances among state
garnishment statutes. 6 Additional confusion results from the provision
in Section 547(e)(3) that a transfer for purposes of determining whether
an avoidable preference has occurred "is not made until the debtor has
acquired rights in the property transferred." 7
The garnishment orders in Coppie provided for a continuing lien on
the debtors' future income to the extent of ten percent of the debtors'
salaries. In asserting the estates' right to wages earned and garnished
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing, the trustees argued that the debt-
ors had no rights in those wages until they are earned; therefore, the
debtors could not have transferred those rights prior to commencement
of the preference period. 8
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, holding that
the relevant transfers occurred when the continuing garnishment orders
were entered, outside of the preference periods. 9 The court found that
under Indiana law, the issuance of a garnishment order makes an em-
ployer directly liable to a garnishing creditor for payment of the wages
subject to that order. 10 It compared the effect of the garnishment order
to "a novation of 10% of the debtor's salary."" Thus, "the debtors no
3. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A).
4. The court cited a number of cases to illustrate this point: in In re Coppie, 728 F.2d 951 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3483 (1985) In re Riddervold, 647 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1981)
(applying New York law); In re Certain, 30 Bankr. 379 (D. Conn. 1983); In re Yamamoto, 21 Bankr.
58 (D. Haw., 1982); In re TMIC Industrial Cleaning Co., 19 Bankr. 397 (W.D. Mo. 1982); In re
Brinker, 12 Bankr. 936 (D. Minn. 1981); In re Woodman, 8 Bankr. 686 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (no
preference); Contra, In re Stoddard, 23 Bankr. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying Virginia law); In re
Walden, 19 Bankr. 630 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re Eggleston, 19 Bankr. 280 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re
Evans, 16 Bankr. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Emery, 13 Bankr. 689 (D. Vt. 1981); In re Brengle, 10
Bankr. 360 (D. Del. 1981); In re Cox, 10 Bankr. 268 (D. Md. 1981) (preference).
5. 728 F.2d 951. (7th Cir. 1984).
6. Id. at 952.
7. Id. "For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3).
8. 728 F.2d at 953.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 952.
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longer had a property interest in 10% of their future salaries." 1 2
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Coppie from its decision in Grain
Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and Savings13 which was ex-
pressly overruled by Congress when it enacted Section 547(e)(3) of the
Code. Grain Merchants dealt not with garnishment order, but with the
issue of whether a security interest in after-acquired accounts receivable
perfected prior to the preference period sufficiently transferred the
debtor's rights in those receivables at that time so as to prevent avoidance
by the trustee. The Seventh Circuit held that no preference had
occurred. 14
Acknowledging Congress' repudiation of the Grain Merchants deci-
sion, the Seventh Circuit in Coppie held that unlike the effect of a contin-
uing garnishment in Indiana, the perfection of a security interest in after-
acquired accounts receivable does not prevent a debtor from acquiring
"some rights in the future accounts receivable when the accounts receiva-
ble come into existence" and does "not transfer ownership of the debtor's
future accounts receivable."' 5 Thus, despite the fact that Section
547(e)(3) overruled the Seventh Circuit's position as to security interests
in after-acquired property, the court held that
Section 547(e)(3) does not come into play in this case simply because
after a garnishment order providing for a continuing lien is entered in
Indiana, a debtor will never acquire rights in the portion of his or her
wages to be garnished in the future. Once a garnishment order has
been entered by a court, the debtor's rights in 10% of his or her future
wages are irrevocably transferred to the garnishment plaintiff.16
A particularly perplexing aspect of the Seventh Circuit opinion in
Coppie is the court's apparently ambiguous conclusion that a continuing
garnishment in Indiana prevents a debtor from ever acquiring rights in
the future wages covered by the order and that these rights which the
debtor will "never acquire" are "irrevocably transferred" under the con-
tinuing garnishment order. The language of Section 547(e)(3) appears to
mandate that a purported transfer by a debtor is not deemed to have
occurred until the debtor acquires rights in the subject property. It is not
clear how an irrevocable transfer of rights could have occurred in Coppie
where the court held that the debtors never acquired any such rights nor
how Section 547(e)(3) really "does not come into play."
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit cited strong support for its posi-
12. Id. at 952, 953.
13. 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. Id.
15. 728 F.2d at 953.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion in Coppie. The decision is based in great part on the Second Cir-
cuit's parallel decision in Riddervold v. Saratoga Hospital,'7 which
involved a New York garnishment statute substantially similar to the In-
diana garnishment statute interpreted in Coppie. Further support is
found in Judge Mabey's attempts to distinguish his finding of a prefer-
ence in Larson v. Olympic Finance Co. t 8 from the Riddervold decision.
He stated that:
Because of the effect of New York law, Section 547(e)(3) was inappli-
cable [in Riddervold]. That section comes into play only if the debtor
acquires rights in the property transferred. In Riddervold, the debtor
never had rights in the property transferred. Any decision reached
here and in other cases may be attributed to differing state law on
whether a debtor who earns wages after a garnishment has been served
has any interest in wages withheld under the garnishment.19
The popular trend in determining Coppie-type problems is to focus
on the debtor's rights to his or her future wages based on applicable state
garnishment law. But these problems must also be resolved with an in-
tellectually honest view of Section 547(e)(3) and in contemplation of the
Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" philosophy. 20
III. INTEREST ON UNSECURED TAX CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 11
In In re Burgess Wholesale Mfg. Opticians, Inc. ,21 the Chapter 11
debot filed a reorganization plan which proposed payment of a federal
tax claim of $14,500.65 in monthly installment over a period of five
years. The debtor asserted that Section 1129(a)(9)(C) requires only that
an unsecured federal tax claim be paid in full for its face amount over a
period of years. 22  The reorganization plan submitted by the debtor
therefore made no provision for the payment of interest on the unsecured
tax claim on the Internal Revenue Service.
17. 647 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1981).
18. Larson v. Olympic Finance Co., 21 Bankr. 264 (D. Utah 1982).
19. Id. at 272, 273 n.12.
20. Whether a garnishment order is continuing or for a set term seems irrelevant other than as
a determinant of the time frame in which the debtor's wages will be garnished. Larson, for example,
was not a continuing garnishment.
21. 721 F.2d 1146 (7th Cir. 1983).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(9)(C) provides:
(a) The Court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(9) Except to the extent that a holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different
treatment of such claim, the plan provides that-
(C) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in Section 507(a)(6) of this title,
the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim deferred cash
payments, over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed
amount of such claim.
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The I.R.S. objected to the debtor's plan because it failed to take into
account the time-value of money. In a well-reasoned analysis, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed both the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court
in holding that the I.R.S. was entitled to interest on its unsecured tax
claim.23
The Seventh Circuit analysis first focused upon the language of Sec-
tion 1129(a)(9)(C). 24 The court held that the debtor's interpretation of
this statute was improper because it disregarded the requirement that the
claimant should receive the "value, as of the effective date of the plan,
equal to the amount of such claim."'25 This means that the payments
must be arranged so as to reflect the time-value of money. 26
The court found strong support for its position in the comments of
the House Judiciary Committee: ". . . 'Value, as of the effective date of
the plan' as used in § 1129(a)(9)' indicates that the promised payment
under the plan must be discounted to present value as of the effective
date of the plan.' "27
It further noted, in essence, that rather than complain about the
need to pay interest where a Chapter 11 plan proposes payment of an
unsecured tax claim in installments, debtors should instead thank Con-
gress for doing away with the pre-Code requirement that unsecured pri-
ority tax claims be paid in full prior to confirmation of a reorganization
plan.28
In dicta, the court also noted that the I.R.S. in Burgess was not
seeking unmatured interest on its claim and that Section 502(b)(2) would
make payment of unmatured interest unavailable in any event. 29 In addi-
tion, the Seventh Circuit specifically declined to discuss the issue of what
an appropriate discount rate would be in making a present value determi-
nation for purposes of Section 1129(a)(9)(C). 30
IV. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO PREPAYMENT PREMIUMS By
SEEKING RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
In a decision critical to real estate lenders, the Seventh Circuit held
23. 721 F.2d at 1146.
24. See Supra note 22.
25. 721 F.2d at 1147, (emphasis added), citing I I U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
26. 721 F.2d at 1147.
27. Id., citing, H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 408, U.S. Code Cong. and Admin.
News 1978, 5787 (1978).
28. Id., citing, 11 U.S.C. § 599 (1976) (repealed 1978).
29. 721 F.2d at 1147, n.1.
30. 721 F.2d at 1147.
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in In re LHD Realty Corporation3' that the filing of a request for relief
from the automatic stay (Section 362(a)) 32 by a mortgage holder can be
deemed an acceleration and result in a waiver by the mortgage holder of
its contractual rights to a prepayment premium. 33
The mortgage agreement in LHD provided that early payment of
the balance due on the underlying loan was permissible, but would sub-
ject the mortgagor to a prepayment premium. 34 After filing its Chapter
1 1 petition, LHD made several late monthly mortgage payments under
the mortgage agreement. The mortgage holder, National Life Insurance
Company ("National"), responded by filing a complaint seeking relief
from the automatic stay in order to foreclose its lien. LHD countered by
seeking court authorization to sell the mortgaged property. After several
hearings on each of these requests, the court denied the relief sought by
National and approved the sale of the property by LHD. 35 It was at that
point that National asserted its right to a prepayment premium pursuant
to the terms of the mortgage agreement.
Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the enforceability of
reasonable prepayment premiums, it cited several limitations on the right
to receive them. One limitation is that a lender waives its right to a pre-
payment premium when it chooses to accelerate the underlying debt. 36
The court explained that: "acceleration, by definition, advances the ma-
turity date of the debt so that payment thereafter is not prepayment but
instead is payment made after maturity."'37
In addition, the Seventh Circuit found that the intention to acceler-
ate can be inferred from the actions of a lender over a period of time. 38
The court described prepayment premiums as "insurance against a de-
cline in interest rates" 39 and described acceleration as a voluntary choice
on the part of a lender to waive the right to this "insurance" in favor of
immediate payment of outstanding principal. By filing its request for re-
lief from the automatic stay, the court held that National had chosen to
31. 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
32. Section 326(a) provides generally for the automatic stay of all proceedings, judicial and
administrative against the debtor which either were or could have been brought against the debtor
prior to the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, or which are based on claims against the
debtor that arose prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 326(a).
33. 726 F.2d at 331.
34. Id. at 329.
35. Id. at 329, 330.
36. Id. at 330, citing, Slevin Container Corp. v. Provident Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 I11. App. 3d
646, 54 I11. Dec. 189, 424 N.E.2d 939 (1984).
37. 726 F.2d at 330, 331.
38. Id. at 331.
39. Id.
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accelerate the debt. "National's actions established that it preferred, sen-
sibly no doubt, accelerated payment over the 'opportunity' to earn inter-
est from the LHD loan over a period of years." 4
Several aspects of LHD are particularly troublesome and several
questions remain unanswered. For example, what other actions in the
context of a bankruptcy case would equate to an election to accelerate?
This uncertainty may cause lenders to hesitate to act for fear of triggering
an unwanted acceleration.
In addition, National asserted that a per se rule that prepayment
premiums are unenforceable after acceleration would lead to intentional
defaults by debtors seeking to avoid paying prepayment premiums. The
Seventh Circuit suggested two solutions to this potential problem. First,
"the lender [could] sidestep the [debtor's] ploy by suing only for overdue
payment as they mature, together with attorney's fees." '41 Second, a
lender, even after acceleration, could "regain the right to its premium by
revoking its acceleration and reinstating the mortgage prior to detrimen-
tal reliance by the borrower on the acceleration."'42
In addition to these suggested lender tactics, the court also opened a
potentially wide back-door to the LHD acceleration exception, conclud-
ing that "should such intentional defaults become a problem, however,
we believe courts could deal with the difficulty by denying the accelera-
tion exception in appropriate cases."'43 This language seems to allow for
the exercise of discretion by bankruptcy courts in determining when the
LHD acceleration exception applies, apparently to prevent debtors from
improperly planning around its invocation. This vaguely enunciated ex-
ception to the exception should create even more uncertainty. Perhaps it
would be best to allow a Chapter 11 debtor to plan around the LHD
acceleration exception, especially in view of the Seventh Circuit's ac-
knowledgement that it is the lender, not the borrower, who chooses
whether or not to accelerate. 44
Another troublesome aspect of LHD is the court's discussion of the
lender's option to revoke its acceleration and reinstate the mortgage ab-
sent detrimental reliance by the borrower. 45 No mention is made by the
Seventh Circuit of how revocation and reinstatement are to take place in
the context of a bankruptcy case, or when it may occur procedurally.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 331, n.4.
43. Id. at 331.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 331 n.4, 333, n.7.
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The court also doesn't discuss what constitutes reliance on the part of a
borrower. Apparently, though, this option could be a key means of
avoiding loss of the right to a prepayment premium. Since LHD is un-
clear as to what lender actions trigger an acceleration, borrowers and
lenders should be equally surprised to learn what actions the courts will
subsequently decide cause acceleration. Thus, it is unlikely that most
debtor/borrowers will be able to prove their reliance on a lender's
acceleration.
The Seventh Circuit rejected Nation's claim that the automatic stay
itself prevents lenders from accelerating a loan after a bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed. It found that although Section 362(a) precludes foreclosure,
"it need not be read to preclude acceleration. '46 Instead, the Seventh
Circuit held that
[S]ince section 1124 recognizes the authority to 'deaccelerate' a mort-
gage and since section 1124(2)(A) refers in this context to defaults (and
presumably accelerations) occuring after commencement of the case
under Chapter 11, the implication is that a lender can accelerate a loan
notwithstanding section 362, subject to its action being reversed pursu-
ant to section 1124. 47
In concluding that National had accelerated its loan and waived its
right to a prepayment premium, the Seventh Circuit indicated in dicta
what it believed the practical effect of LHD would be. In order to retain
its right to a prepayment premium, the lender could simply refrain from
exercising its acceleration option and wait for a decision by the trustee or
the debtor. If the trustee or debtor then decides to repay the loan, the
lender "presumably" could enforce the prepayment premium provision,
provided it is valid in other respects. 48
Finally, the Seventh Circuit appears to have left a trail to follow in
the search for an escape from the LHD trap. The court, after describing
the various exceptions to the enforceability of reasonable prepayment
premium clauses in mortgage agreements, noted that "[t]hese exceptions
have been read into contracts by courts and could presumably be modi-
fied by the parties through appropriate contractual provisions."'49 Thus,
careful drafting of mortgage agreements could be the most direct means
of avoiding a waiver of an otherwise enforceable prepayment premium in
the wake of LHD.
46. Id. at 332.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 331 n.5.
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE PRIORITY CLAIMS
The Seventh Circuit decision In re Jartran, Inc. ,50 is most significant
for its analysis of the law regarding administrative priority claims in a
Chapter 11 case and for the unique factual circumstances under which it
arose. The court held that Jartran's pre-bankruptcy irevocable commit-
ment to purchase classified telephone directory advertising from Reuben
H. Donnelley Corporation ("Donnelley") did not create an administra-
tive priority claim despite the fact that the ads appeared in the directories
after the Chapter 11 case was commenced. 51
Under section 503, administrative priority claims include "the ac-
tual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including
.. .commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the
case. "52
Donnelley argued that since the ads were published post-petition
and were important in Jartran's efforts to reorganize, they should be
treated as priority administrative expenses and thus be paid before many
of Jartran's pre-petition creditors. 53 In rejecting Donnelley's argument,
the Seventh Circuit followed the test set forth by the Supreme Court in
the pre-Code case of In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.54 Under Mammoth
Mart, a claim is treated as a priority administrative expense "if the debt
both (1) 'arise[s] from a transaction with the debtor-in-possession' and
(2) is 'beneficial to the debtor-in-possession in the operation of the busi-
ness.' ",55 The Seventh Circuit noted that while the ads were certainly
beneficial to the reorganization efforts of Jartran, the relevant transaction
did not occur with the debtor-in-possession, but with the pre-bankruptcy
Jartran.5 6
The court found that the underlying purpose of the administrative
expense priority was to enable financially strapped debtors to obtain
credit in order to remain in business and facilitate a reorganization ef-
fort.5 7 It held that reorganization efforts would be of limited effective-
ness without provisions like Section 503: debtors would be unlikely to
50. Matter of Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 587.
52. Section 503(b)(l)(A) in its entirety provides:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses, other than
claims allowed under Section 502(f) of this title, including-
(l)(A) the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including
wages, salaries, or commencement of the case; 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982).
53. 732 F.2d at 586.
54. 536 F.2d 950 (lst Cir. 1976).
55. 732 F.2d at 587, citing Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d at 954.
56. 732 F.2d at 587.
57. Id. at 586.
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persuade creditors to advance required goods and services to them if the
creditors had no assurances that their claims would be given priority. 58
Furthermore, the court held that the administrative expense priority was
not unfair with regard to pre-petition creditors, since reorganization is
attempted for their benefit. 59
Because of these policies, the Seventh Circuit found the issue of "in-
ducement" of creditors' performances under their agreements with debt-
ors to be "crucial" to determination of administrative priority claims. 60
The court upheld the bankruptcy court's determination that the debtor-
in-possession in Jartran in no way induced performance on the part of
Donnelley, and noted that the inducement by the debtor-in-possession
was unnecessary "since the liability for the costs of the ads was irrevoca-
bly incurred before the petition was filed." '61 Notably, though, the court
specifically declined to address the issue of what conduct would consti-
tute an inducement sufficient to result in a determination that a contract
had been affirmed by a debtor-in-possession so as to be entitled to admin-
istrative priority status. 62
In addition, the Seventh Circuit also rejected Donnelley's assertion
that "equity and fairness" required that their claim be accorded adminis-
trative priority status. 63 It concluded that allowing Donnelley's equita-
ble claim and that of other creditors whose extension of credit benefited a
Chapter 1 1 debtor-in-possession would defeat the purpose of the admin-
istrative expense priority-to encourage the extention of credit to Chap-
ter 11 debors.64
The court stated it was not able to conclude that its decision would
result in a "major disruption" in Yellow Pages advertising. The court
stated that all creditors assume, to some extent, the risk of bankruptcy,
and that Donnelley may have assumed it for too long by its arrangement
with Jartran. The court mentioned insurance or different methods of
payment to "ameliorate the difficulties caused by advertiser bankrup-
tices." However, the court said significant problems should be left for
Congress. 65
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 587.
61. Id. at 586, 587.
62. Id. at 591.
63. Id. at 590.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 590-1.
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VI. REOPENING A CASE & TIMELY FILING OF A PROOF OF CLAIM
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge
under Section 727, 1141, or 1328(b)66 does not discharge an individual
debtor from liability on any debt which is-
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with
the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, in time to permit- (a) if such debt is not of a kind specified in
paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof
of claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of
the case in time for such timely filing;67
The Seventh Circuit in In re Stark,68 examined the phrase "timely
filing of a proof of claim" under Section 523(a)(3)(A) to determine
whether debtors who had failed to list or schedule a creditor in a no-asset
Chapter 7 case could reopen their case after discharge to add the omitted
creditor.69 The court in Stark also shed light upon the considerations
which a court must make in determining whether reopening a closed case
would be appropriate.
The Starks had incurred a debt to St. Mary's Hospital ("St.
Mary's") for medical services provided just prior to the filing of their
bankruptcy petition.70 Believing that their insurance carrier would pay
the hospital bill, the Starks felt it unnecessary to list St. Mary's in their
schedules. 71 The debt ultimately went unpaid and St. Mary's obtained a
judgment in state court against the Starks in the amount of the debt. 72
The Starks, having previously received a discharge in their Chapter 7
case, sought to reopen the case in order to add St. Mary's to their list of
creditors. 73
St. Mary's argued that allowing the Starks to reopen their Chapter 7
case would be improper as it would enable the Starks to discharge a debt
which would otherwise have been non-dischargeable under Section
523(a)(3)(A). 74 Additionally, St. Mary's asserted that even if the case
were reopened, a timely claim could not be filed due to the fact that the
66. Section 727 governs the discharge of debts in cases of liquidation. II U.S.C. § 727 (1982).
Section 1141 governs the discharge of debts in reorganization cases. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982). Sec-
tion 1328(b) governs the discharge of debts of an individual debtor who has failed to complete pay-
ments under a confirmed plan, due to hardship. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1982).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (1982).
68. 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983).
69. 717 F.2d at 179, 180.
70. 717 F.2d at 179.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 717 F.2d at 180.
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six month filing period prescribed by Rule 302(e)(4) had passed. 75
The Seventh Circuit focused its analysis upon Bankruptcy Rules of
Procedure 203(b) 76 and 302(e)(4). 77 Based on these procedural rules, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court and held that the case could
be reopened to allow for the addition of St. Mary's to the list of credi-
tors.78  The court reasoned that since a "Notice of No Dividend" had
been filed in the Starks' Chapter 7 case, all of the Starks' creditors, in-
cluding St. Mary's, would still have the opportunity to file a timely proof
of claim in accordance with Rule 302(e)(4) if assets were ultimately lo-
cated.79 It held that St. Mary's was to be treated the same as the Starks'
other creditors in this regard, despite the fact that St. Mary's had previ-
ously not been listed or scheduled by the Starks. 80
The Seventh Circuit stated one clear prerequisite to reopening a case
to add a creditor. Where the court finds that the creditor whom the
debtor seeks to add was not listed or scheduled by the debtor due to
fraud or intentional design, equitable considerations dictate that reopen-
ing the case not be allowed.8' The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Dis-
trict Court that a bankruptcy court "should exercise its equitable powers
with respect to substance and not technical considerations that will pre-
75. Id.
76. 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983). Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 203(b) provides:
(b) Notice of No Dividend. If it appears from the schedules that there are no assets from
which a dividend can be paid, the court may include in the notice of the first meeting a
statement to that effect, that it is unnecessary to file claims, and that if sufficient assets
become available for the payment of a dividend, the court will give further notice of the
opportunity to file claims and the amount allowed therefore.
Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 203(b), which was applicable in Stark, has since been superceded by
Rule 2002(e). Rule 2002(e) provides:
(e) Notice of No Dividend. In a chapter 7 liquidation case, if it appears from the sched-
ules that there are no assets from which a dividend can be paid, the notice of the meeting of
a creditors may include a statement to that effect; that it is unnecessary to file claims; and
that if sufficient assets become available for the payment of a dividend, further notice will
be given for the filing of claims.
77. Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 302(e)(4) provides:
(e) Time for Filing. A claim must be filed within 6 months after the first date set for the
first meeting of creditors, except as follows:
(4) If notice of no dividend was given to creditors pursuant to Rule 203(b), and subse-
quently the payment of a dividend appears possible, the court shall notify the creditors of
that fact and shall grant them a reasonable, fixed time for filing their claims of not less than
60 days after the mailing of the notice or 6 months after the first date set for the first
meeting of creditors, whichever is the later.
Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 302(e)(4), which was applicable in Stark, has since been superceded
by Rule 3002(c) which reduces the time for filing in most cases to within 90 days after the first date
set for the meeting of creditors called pursuant to Section 34 1(a).
78. 717 F.2d at 324.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 323.
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vent substantial justice. ' 82
Particularly notable in Stark is the Seventh Circuit's apparent en-
dorsement of the District Court finding that "Section 523(a) should not
be mechanically applied to deprive a debtor of a discharge in a no asset
case where there is no showing of fraud or genuine harm to the credi-
tors."'8 3 This statement is important because it appears to set forth an
additional prerequisite to the reopening of a closed case. The Seventh
Circuit apparently agrees that prior to having its Chapter 7 case re-
opened in order to add an omitted creditor, a debtor must also show that
reopening the case will not cause genuine harm to the creditors. In addi-
tion to merely reciting the District Court's finding in this regard, the
Seventh Circuit apparently applied the genuine harm standard in Stark
by finding that "[i]n this case the creditor has not been harmed in any
way, and the debtors have not been required to forfeit any of their bene-
fits under the Bankruptcy Code."'8 4
But just what was meant by the "genuine harm" language in Stark?
The finding of the District Court regarding the genuine harm standard is
couched in terminology relating to an objection to discharge under Sec-
tion 727,85 not dischargeability of a debt under Section 523 as would
seem appropriate under the facts in Stark. This language was adopted by
the District Court from a case arising under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
In re Callaham, 6 and indicates either an unfortunate drafting error, or
conceptual confusion on the part of the Callaham court, as well as the
District Court and Seventh Circuit via their apparent adoption of this
language. Although possibility of an error is most likely, the flaw is espe-
cially ironic in view of the fact that the holding in Stark apparently al-
lows a debtor to reopen a case and add a creditor who is not able due to
time limitations to file an objection to a debtor's discharge under Section
727(a). Although the added creditor could seek a revocation of the
debtor's discharge under Section 727(d),8 7 the grounds giving rise to this
relief are narrower than those giving rise to a denial of discharge under
82. Id. at 323, noting that District Court cited Kenneally v. Standard Electronics Corp., 364
F.2d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 1966).
83. 727 F.2d at 323, noting that District Court cited In re Callaham, [1977-78] Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) 66,465 (E.D. Ore. May 5, 1977).
84. Id. at 324.
85. Section 727(a) generally provides that "the court shall grant the debtor a discharge," pro-
vided that the debtor is acting in good faith, has not been granted a discharge in bankruptcy in the
preceeding six years, and is not guilty of any specified acts of bad faith or fraud. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)
(1982).
86. In re Callaham, [1977-78] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 66,465 (E.D. Ore. May 5, 1977).
87. Section 727(d) provides:
(d) On request of the trustee or a creditor, and after notice of a hearing, the court shall
revoke a discharge granted under subsection (a) of this section if-
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Section 727(a). Aside from appearing to yield an inequitable result, an
argument could be made that this result itself displays the existence of
"genuine harm" imparted upon the added creditor.
A better approach might be to set a final deadline for the listing or
scheduling of creditors, with the subsequent case reopening and creditor
additions completely restricted or limited to showings of circumstances
more extraordinary than negligence on the part of the debtor.
VII. THE TRUSTEE'S DUTY UNDER THE LABOR LAWS
Yorke v. National Labor Relations Board8 8 (NLRB) adds another
chapter to the growing body of law dealing with the relationship between
the bankruptcy laws and the labor laws. The Seventh Circuit, in an opin-
ion written by Senior Judge William H. Timbers of the Second Circuit,8 9
held that a bankruptcy trustee, like any other employer, has a duty to
observe and comply with workers' rights under the labor laws to the ex-
tent that they are not inconsistent with the trustee's duties under the
Bankruptcy Code. 90 More particularly, the court found that the Chapter
11 trustee had a duty, pursuant to Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act,9 1 to conduct effects bargaining with the
labor union over the effects on union member employees of his decision
to terminate the Chapter 11 debtor's operations. 92 As the Seventh Cir-
cuit explained, " 'effects' bargaining provides the Union with an opportu-
nity to bargain in the employees' interest for such benefits as severance
pay, payments into the pension fund, preferential hiring if the employer
continues operating at other plants, and reference letters with respect to
other jobs."'9 3
(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and the requesting
party did not know of such fraud until after the granting of such discharge;
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate, or became entitled to
acquire property that would be property of the estate, and knowingly and fraudulently
failed to report the acquisition of, or entitlement to, such property, or to deliver or
surrender such property to the trustee; or
(3) the debtor committed an act specified in subsection (a)(6) of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 727(d) (1982).
88. 709 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 1276 (1984).
89. Sitting by designation.
90. 709 F.2d at 1142.
91. Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act provide:
Sec. 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of Section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(5) (1982).
92. 709 F.2d at 1143.
93. Id.
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Yorke is significant in that it is a case of first impression and appears
to be supported by the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Bildisco and
Bildisco94 as well as the recently enacted Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"). The Seventh Circuit made
its policy position clear in Yorke: "The law in question-the duty to
bargain over the effects of a decision to terminate operations-strikes us
as critical to protect employees from the ravages of economic
dislocation." 95
In addition, the court found that although the trustee's discretion in
bargaining with the union might be impeded by the need to obtain bank-
ruptcy court authorization, "that limitation can be taken into account in
any bargaining." 96 "We believe that recognizing a duty to bargain would
not unduly impede the Trustee's discharge of his responsibilities. '97
Moreover, "[w]hile the Trustee may have been required to obtain the
bankruptcy courts' authorization before granting concessions, the
Trustee could have bargained subject to that approval. '98
Finding that the trustee had failed to engage in good faith "effects"
bargaining with the union, the Seventh Circuit upheld a limited backpay
order imposed by the NLRB on the debtor-corporation. 99 The court
rejected the trustee's argument that there can be no meaningful bargain-
ing with a debtor-corporation due to the inability of such a company to
make concessions, noting that at the time the company closed its doors it
possessed nearly $6,000,000 worth of unliquidated assets.
In essence, the Seventh Circuit's analysis of Yorke seems to be dis-
proportiontely weighed in favor of the labor laws. The policies underly-
ing the Bankruptcy Code in general, and the policies and provisions
relating to the powers and duties of trustees specifically are largely ig-
nored. Rather than being a "correct" decision, Yorke is arguably the
product of an unequal balancing of labor and bankruptcy law policies
which yielded a result that subsequently corresponded to a revised Con-
gressional intent as expressed in Subtitle J of BAFJA.' °°
In this regard, dissenting Circuit Judge Coffey vehemently criticized
the majority for its failure to properly weigh these important considera-
tions. Judge Coffey was distressed by what he perceived as the majority's
disregard for the fact that this was a matter which arose in the context of
94. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
95. 709 F.2d at 1143.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1145.
99. 709 F.2d at 1144.
100. See infra text accompanying note 106.
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a bankruptcy case.10 By ignoring this distinction, the majority failed to
give adequate consideration to the limitations placed on a trustee's au-
thority, thereby "encroaching on the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive juris-
diction over Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings."'10 2 Furthermore, he
stated that the majority opinion undermined the policy goals involved in
bankruptcy cases by failing to properly balance the interests of revital-
izing business and achieving acceptable labor relations. 0 3 Finally, he
concluded that
• ..the majority's decision foists an unreasonable burden on business
enterprises involved in Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings. It is the
height of absurdity for the NLRB to exert a fatal chokehold on Con-
gress' (sic) specific intent to allow mortally wounded businesses a
chance to make a financial comeback at a time when our basic indus-
tries are struggling to survive." °4
Perhaps not so coincidentally, the day after it denied certiorari in
Yorke, the Supreme Court decided Bildisco and in dictum implied its
approval of the Yorke result. 0 5 After dealing broadly with the enforce-
ability of collective bargaining agreements after a bankruptcy petition is
filed but prior to their acceptance or rejection by a debtor-in-possession
or trustee, the 5-4 majority concluded that:
our determination that a debtor-in-possession does not commit an un-
fair labor practice by failing to comply with § 8(d) prior to formal re-
jection of the collective-bargaining agreement does undermine the
policy of the NLRA, for that policy, as we have noted, is to protect the
process of labor negotiations, not to impose particular results on the
parties. . . . but while a debtor-in-possession remains obligated to
bargain in good faith under NLRA § 8(a)(5) over the terms and condi-
tions of a possible new contract, it is not guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice by unilaterally breaching a collective-bargaining agreement before
formal Bankruptcy Court action. 10 6
Bildisco and York are distinguishable in that Yorke deals only with
general good faith bargaining duties under § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(5),
whereas Bildisco deals with the duty to bargain as it relates to the accept-
ance and rejection of collective bargaining agreements. Bildisco clearly
stops short of shielding trustees and debtors-in-possession from otherwise
incurring liability under the NLRA's good faith bargaining provisions.
In addition, the recent enactment of BAFJA can be construed as
giving even greater vitality to Yorke. The new provisions found in Subti-
101. 709 F.2d at 1147 (J. Coffey dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1150, 1151 (J. Coffey dissenting).
104. 709 F.2d at 1151 (J. Coffey dissenting).
105. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
106. Id. at 1200, 1201.
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tie J of BAFJA require a series of actions that a debtor-in-possession or
trustee must take in order to terminate or alter provisions of an existing
collective bargaining agreement."0 7
The significance of these new provisions is that they manifest a dis-
tinct Congressional policy change (resulting from the outcry over
Bildisco) and extend good faith bargaining requirements into the previ-
ously untouchable realm of the collective bargaining agreement in bank-
ruptcy cases. Certainly Congress' extension of these duties in the wake
of Bildisco serves as a reinforcement for the findings in Yorke and
Bildisco regarding the enforceability of the labor laws as to general good-
faith bargaining duties.
Also notable in Yorke is the Seventh Circuit's finding that the impo-
sition of a limited backpay requirement on a corporation, guilty of a la-
bor law violation occurring prior to commencement of the bankruptcy
case, is not inappropriate merely because the company is a Chapter 11
debtor. Specifically, the court held that:
[t]he purpose of the limited backpay requirement in such circum-
stances is not to punish, but to create an incentive for the Company to
bargain in good faith. Ensuring meaningful bargaining comports with
the primary objective of the [National Labor Relations] Act. 0 8
VIII. WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY BANKRUPTCY
TRUSTEE
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the communication
privileges, 0 9 and its importance has long been recognized."t 0 Despite
the importance of the privilege throughout the common law, however, its
status in the context of a bankruptcy case is currently in question. Re-
cent decisions by the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal have held that bankruptcy trustees can, under certain
circumstances, waive the attorney-client privilege of debtor-corpor-
107. Section 1113(f) of Subtitle J provides:
"No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or
alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the pro-
visions of this Section."
108. 709 F.2d at 1145. Such an award apparently would be treated as an administrative expense
entitled to priority. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507(a)(1).
109. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (1961). The attorney-client privilege has been estab-
lished for over four centuries. The privileges existing between a husband and a wife are also long-
established, but their origins are less clear. Other privileges, such as that between physician and
patient or priest and penitent, have been established relatively recently, generally by statute. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2286 et. seq. (1961).
110. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981); Fisher v. United
States of America, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976).
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tions."' 1 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, recently rejected the
position of the Second and Eighth Circuits and refused to uphold the
trustee's asserted waiver of the debtor-corporation's attorney-client
privilege. 11 2
The Seventh Circuit, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub,' 3 observed that despite the broad grant of power given to
bankruptcy trustees by the Bankruptcy code, "nowhere is the trustee
given specific statutory authority either to assert or waive a corporate-
debtor's attorney-client privilege."' 4 The court held that the trustee of a
Chapter 7 debtor-corporation did not have the power to waive the corpo-
ration's attorney-client privilege as to communications occurring on or
before the commencement of the case.11 5 The U.S. Supreme Court re-
cently granted certiorari in the Weintraub case to resolve the conflict
among the circuits of this important question." 6
In Weintraub, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) had instituted an enforcement proceeding against Chicago Dis-
count Commodity Brokers, Inc. ("CDCB") in the district court. By con-
sent, the court appointed an equity receiver. The equity receiver placed
the corporation into bankruptcy, filing a Chapter 7 petition under the
Code's special provisions for commodity broker liquidations.' 17 The re-
ceiver was ultimately named permanent trustee by the bankruptcy court.
In the course of the CFTC investigation relating to the enforcement
action against CDCB in district court, the Commission deposed Gary
Weintraub, an attorney formerly representing CDCB." 8 Weintraub re-
fused to answer several questions, asserting the attorney-client privi-
lege. '9 The CFTC's motion to compel Weintraub to answer was granted
by a federal magistrate who ruled that the trustee for CDCB formally
waived the company's attorney-client privilege as to pre-filing communi-
cations and information.' 20 The district court affirmed and the issue was
then presented to the Seventh Circuit.' 2'
111. In re O.P.M. Leasing Service Inc., 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); Citibank, N.A. v. Andros,
666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Boileau & Johnson, Inc., 736 F.2d 503 (9th cir. 1984) (court-
appointed examiner with expanded powers, rather than a trustee).
112. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 321 (1984).
113. 722 F.2d 338 (1984).
114. Id. at 342, n.8.
115. Id. at 343.
116. Certiorari was granted on 10-29-84. See supra note 102.
117. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-766 (1982).
118. 722 F.2d at 339.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 722 F.2d at 339, 340.
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The three-member Seventh Circuit panel readily accepted the prop-
osition that the attorney-client privilege extends to corporations, includ-
ing those which have filed for protection under the bankruptcy laws.
12 2
As the Supreme Court recently stated, the purpose of the privilege is to
encourage "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients. . . . The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advo-
cacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer being fully informed by the client."' 123 Similarly, in Fisher v.
United States, the Court noted that the purpose of the privilege is "to
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorney."'
1 24
It is also well settled that the attorney-client privilege may be waived
by the client. 25 However, when the "client" is a corporation, the issue
has arisen as to whom is empowered to waive the privilege. Generally,
courts have held that the power rests with the board of directors or with
authorized corporate agents, because a corporation can only act through
its officers. 126 However, in the bankruptcy context, a majority of courts
which have had occasion to rule on the issue have held that the bank-
ruptcy trustee has the authority to waive the corporate attorney-client
privilege. 127
The Second Circuit, in In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. ,128 re-
cently upheld the trustee's waiver of a corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege over the objection of the company's former president and director.
In O.P.M., due to resignations, the corporation had no officers and direc-
tors during the trustee's term, unlike the situation in Weintraub where
one officer and director remained active in the corporation after the
trustee's appointment. The Second Circuit noted:
We hold that in this situation the power to make such a decision as is
encompassed by assertion or waiver of the important attorney-client
privilege adheres to the trustee by virtue of the nonexistence of any
other entity authorized to so act. 12
9
The Seventh Circuit considered the O.P.M. decision in the Wein-
traub case, but distinguished it on the basis that unlike O.P.M., CDCB
122. 722 F.2d 338, 340 (1984), citing Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d
314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 375 U.S. 929.
123. Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
124. 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
125. Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 408 (1897); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
126. Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 935 U.S.
942 (1978).
127. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cit. 1982); Citibank, N.A. v.
Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1982).
128. 670 F.2d 383 (2d cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 387.
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still reatined an officer/director capable of deciding whether to assert the
company's attorney-client privilege.
In Citibank, N.A. v. Andros,130 the Eighth Circuit upheld the
trustee's power to waive a debtor-corporation's attorney-client privilege
over the objection of the remaining corporate officers. Acknowledging
the factual similarities between Weintraub and Andros, the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the power to invoke a
debtor-corporation's attorney-client privilege passes with the property of
the debtor-corporation to the bankruptcy trustee. 131 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the court in Andros, like the court in O.P.M., failed to support
its conclusion with a discussion of the policies underlying the attorney-
client privilege. 132
The Seventh Circuit found that a corporation is still capable of nu-
merous functions after filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, and is
not replaced as an entity by the trustee. 133 Nor, the court noted, does the
trustee automatically succeed to the officer and director positions of a
debtor-corporation. The Seventh Circuit found that "[t]he trustee may
hold the power to manage the bankrupt corporation's property and as-
sets, but he does not thereby acquire absolute power over the corpora-
tion's legal rights."1 34
This conclusion finds support in the Bankruptcy Code. The com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate consisting of all of the
tangible and intangible property of the debtor. 135 The trustee acquires
this estate together with certain additional powers; i.e., to avoid fraudu-
lent transfers, 136 to recover preferential transfers, 137 and to avoid various
liens.138 The trustee also acquires the right to manage the debtor's busi-
ness. 139 While the extent of the property and powers expressly granted
to the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code is extensive, there is no specific
grant to the trustee of the power to waive a debtor's legal privileges. No
statutory basis has been found suggesting the trustee holds such a power.
130. 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1982).
131. The Eight Circuit in Citibank stated that the Bankruptcy Code vested broad management
powers in the trustee, and that "[b]ecause the right to decide whether to waive a corporation's attor-
ney-client privilege belongs to management, the right to assert or waive that privilege passes with the
property of the corporate debtor to the trustee." 666 F.2d at 1195.
132. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, at 341-42, and n.6.
133. Id. at 342, citing 15 A.W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 7657 (Revised Ed.
1981).
134. Id. at 342.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
BANKRUPTCY
Ownership of the corporate entity does not pass to the trustee; rather, the
trustee receives only the assets owned by the corporation itself, along
with certain enumerated powers. 140 The shareholders continue to own
the corporate entity and the entity remains in the shareholders' ultimate
control.
Despite the apparent support for the Seventh Circuit position found
in the Bankruptcy Code generally, distinguishing between the debtor-
corporation's legal rights and the trustee's management powers may
prove problematic in practice. Specifically, how will a trustee know if a
contemplated action is one that his fiduciary duty requires him to take in
order to properly manage the assets of the debtor-corporation, or
whether it is one that will be deemed an improper exercise of the debtor-
corporation's legal rights? The Seventh Circuit offers no guidelines for
making such a determination, and the result may be hesitancy and confu-
sion on the part of trustees in certain circumstances.
It has been asserted that if the trustee held the power to waive the
attorney-client privilege, some possible benefit to the estate may inure.
Generally, however, it would only save the trustee the effort involved in
finding facts on his own without the use of privileged information. If he
could not obtain otherwise privileged information from the debtor's at-
torney, he would still be free to obtain the desired information by use of
ordinary discovery rules and his own investigation. As the Supreme
Court noted, "The privilege only protects disclosure of communication;
it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who com-
municated with the attorney." 1 4' The Supreme Court also stated that a
witness cannot refuse to answer a relevant question merely because he
had discussed the subject with his attorney.
It is essential for an attorney to have all available information from
his client if he is adequately represent his client in any legal proceeding,
including a bankruptcy case. The court in Weintraub recognized the
chilling effect on attorney-client communications which could result if a
trustee could waive the privilege and require the debtor's attorney to re-
veal confidential information. The result could be that the attorney for a
debtor is given less than complete information, or possibly false informa-
tion, because the sophisticated debtor would know that his attorney
could be required to reveal the client's communication in the future.
The possibility for abuse extends even beyond the chilling effects
suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Weintraub. For example, such a
140. 722 F.2d at 342.
141. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
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power would seem to be an open invitation to use the Bankruptcy Code
for purposes of discovery. If a creditor is involved in litigation against a
debtor, he could, theoretically, file an involuntary petition against the
debtor, and (assuming grounds for the petition are proven) have the
trustee require the debtor's attorney to reveal all of the contemplated
defenses and communications. Furthermore, the bankruptcy trustee
himself could use his power to waive the debtor-corporation's attorney-
client privilege for discovery purposes, to the detriment of the debtor. As
the Seventh Circuit stated, "[S]uch a passing of the privilege could en-
gender the absurd result of the trustee waiving the debtor's privilege as to
information sought by the trustee."' 142
In fact, the "absurd result" envisioned by the Seventh Circuit was
actually reached three months after Weintraub by the Ninth Circuit in In
re Boileau & Johnson, Inc.143 In Boileau, a court-appointed examiner
was enabled to waive the debtors-corporation's attorney-client privilege
so as to compel the debtor-in-possession to produce written pre-petition
attorney-client communications. The Ninth Circuit carefully noted that
the examiner in Boileau had been specifically empowered with many of
the rights and duties of a trustee and that the decision therefore was not
determinative of the right of an examiner without these expanded powers
to waive a debtor-corporation's attorney-client privilege. 144
Despite its unique factual setting, Boileau is still a valuable aid in
reviewing the Seventh Circuit's ruling on a trustee's power to waive the
debtor's attorney-client privilege. The Ninth Circuit afforded little
weight to Weintraub in reaching its decision, making clear that the Sev-
enth Circuit approach stood alone as a minority view. The Ninth Circuit
made no mention of an asset and property management/legal rights di-
chotomy of the type utilized in Weintraub,45 yet it is readily apparent in
Boileau that the relative powers and duties of the debtor and the exam-
iner played an essential role in determining who possessed the power to
waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege.
In Boileau, since a trustee had not actually been appointed, the
debtor remained a "debtor-in-possession."' 146 But, as the Court noted,
the debtor's role as a debtor-in-possession, in view of the expanded pow-
ers given to the examiner, was "nominal."' 147 He no longer held any
142. 722 F.2d at 343.
143. 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 506.
145. See supra note 122.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982).
147. 736 F.2d at 506.
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BANKRUPTCY
"4substantial participation in the management of Boileau & Johnson." 148
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the debtor-in-possession in Boileau re-
tained no authority to assert the corporate attorney-client privilege and
ordered that the letters at issue be turned over to the examiner. 149
It seems logical to infer from Boileau that had the debtor-in-posses-
sion retained some significant degree of managerial power over the com-
pany, the corporate attorney-client privilege would not have passed to
the examiner. If this was the key Ninth Circuit criteria, it can be implied
that had a trustee, with its significantly more extensive managerial pow-
ers and duties, been in place in Boileau, the Ninth Circuit would have
found that the corporate attorney-client privilege had passed to the
trustee. 150
The Ninth Circuit would probably have joined the majority view
and held contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Weintraub. The
Seventh Circuit, however, would find the Ninth Circuit, as it did the
Second and Eighth Circuits, guilty of failing to consider sufficiently the
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege.1 51
The mere economic plight of a client is no basis for extinguishing
the attorney-client privilege. In Weintraub, the Seventh Circuit found
that allowing a trustee to waive a debtor-corporation's attorney-client
privilege discriminated against debtor-corporations solely on the basis of
economic status. The court stated that "[a] solvent . . . corporation, as
long as it remains solvent, can freely assert or waive its attorney-client
privilege. Once the corporation enters bankruptcy, however, it would
lose to the trustee the power to control the privilege."'15 2
This point has more validity when phrased in terms of "debtor com-
panies vs. non-debtor companies" as opposed to "solvent companies vs.
insolvent companies." Since insolvency is not a prerequisite to a corpo-
ration's filing for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, an insolvent
corporation would not necessarily have to file a bankruptcy petition to
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. It is unclear in Boileau whether there remained "any other entity" authorized to exercise
the corporate attorney-client privilege under the O.P.M standards although it would appear that at
least one officer or director of the corporation remained in office. If not, however, it is possible that
the Seventh Circuit would distinguish Boileau, as it did O.P.M., based on the lack of any other
person with the authority to exercise the corporate attorney-client privilege.
151. Note that Boileau had also filed a Chapter 1 petition individually. He thus asserted that
compelling production of the letters would violate his fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion. The Ninth Circuit rejected Boileau's argument, finding that the production of documents re-
quired no oral testimony on Boileau's part and that the letters were addressed to the general counsel
and general partners of the corporation, Boileau & Johnson, and not Boileau individually, thus mak-
ing the fifth amendment privilege inapplicable.
152. Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 343.
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lose its right to assert the attorney-client privilege, and a solvent corpora-
tion could lose its right to assert the attorney-client privilege should it
choose to file a bankruptcy petition.
In any event, the Seventh Circuit's point is clear that "[w]hile the
trustee's interest in investigating the affairs of the corporate debtor on
behalf of the creditors is certainly legitimate, it does not justify erosion of
the corporation's attorney-client privilege simply on the basis of a change
in economic circumstances."1 53 This was certainly the most critical as-
pect of the Seventh Circuit's decision. Allowing a trustee to waive a
debtor-corporation's attorney-client privilege as to pre-filing communica-
tions and information will chill attorney-client communications. Corpo-
rate clients will be unwilling or hesitant to confide in attorneys for fear of
a loss of confidentiality in the event of a subsequent bankruptcy filing.
Equally serious is the potential "chilling effect" on a financially troubled
corporation's willingness to seek the protection of the Bankruptcy Code.
A company that has confided in counsel regarding particularly sensitive
information may choose to forego what might otherwise be a successful
reorganization in order to preserve it's attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, it is often in times of financial distress that a company
most needs and seeks the advice and counsel of its attorneys. This is
certainly the most traditional form of argument in defense of the attor-
ney-client privilege and one which has arisen in a multitude of contexts.
The Court was unambiguous in describing its overriding concern in
Weintraub: "Free interchange between attorney and client is the corner-
stone of effective legal representation." 154 A strong argument can be
made that the importance of preventing the chilling of attorney-client
communications outweighs the possible negative effect on the effective-
ness of trustees in carrying out their duties.
Although the decision in Weintraub appears to be limited to situa-
tions in which there remains an officer or director authorized to assert or
waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege, a broader reading could
easily be implied. Although the Seventh Circuit distinguished O.P.M
based on its lack of officers and directors, the court at no point stated
that it agreed with the O.P.M decision. The chilling effect on pre-filing
attorney-client communications would be no less severe if the privilege
could be waived by the trustee in a subsequent bankruptcy case merely
because the officers and directors have resigned or been dismissed. The
economic discrimination concerns described by the court would also not
153. Id.
154. Id.
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dissipate. In view of the factors which the Seventh Court found to be
most persuasive in Weintraub, it would not be unreasonable to expect an
extension of its application to facts such as those in O.P.M.
The Weintraub decision serves as a guide to attorneys on the issue of
whether a trustee in the case of an individual debtor can waive the
debtor's attorney-client privilege. Clearly, the Seventh Circuit believes
that the trustee in an individual case has no such power. 155 The court, by
way of a footnote, specifically rejected the contrary finding of the bank-
ruptcy court in the Chapter 7 case of In re Smith. 156 The Smith decision,
the Seventh Circuit noted, is based essentially upon the corporate-debtor
cases of O.P.M. and Andros.'7 The Smith court found that: "Any attor-
ney-client privilege which the debtor had passes by operation of law to
the bankruptcy trustee."'' 58
The cases are noticeably silent as to the trustee's power to assert or
waive a corporate-debtor's attorney-client privilege as to communica-
tions and information occurring after the filing of a bankruptcy petition
or after the trustee is appointed. The result should be based on the same
policies and legislative authorities the court used in reaching its decision
in Weintraub; the corporation should retain its privilege, waived only by
its board of directors or authorized agents.
The importance of the attorney-client privilege is recognized by
Federal Rule of Evidence 501.159 It is a policy that has survived chal-
lenges for the hundreds of years it has existed at common law. There is
no adequate reason suggested by any of the cited cases for its demise in
bankruptcy cases. The rule allows clients to speak freely with their coun-
sel, and does not destroy the trustee's ability to discover facts.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has clearly taken on a more active role in the
area of bankruptcy law during the past year. It has aggressively dealt
with controversial and previously unaddressed issues and has provided
lower courts and practitioners with much-needed interpretive guidance.
The coming year should find the Seventh Circuit faced with a flurry
155. The Seventh Circuit also found that it would be unfairly discriminatory to allow the trustee
of a debtor-corporation to waive the Company's attorney-client privilege, whereas a trustee in an
individual case cannot waive the individual debtor's attorney-client privilege. 722 F.2d at 342.
156. 24 Bankr. 3 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
157. 722 F.2d at 343, note 9.
158. 24 Bankr. at 5.
159. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness . . .shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience." 28 U.S.C. App. R. 501 (1982).
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of new and important bankruptcy issues as the bankruptcy and district
courts, still in the early stages of developing a body of case law under the
Bankruptcy Code, struggle to revise and expand their initial interpreta-
tions to implement the new and amended provisions contained in
BAFJA.
